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1
Financial Implications from Contracting Avian Influenza  
in a U.S. Broiler Operation
Jordan M. Shockley (University of Kentucky), Tyler Mark (University of Kentucky),  
Kenneth H. Burdine (University of Kentucky), and Levi Russell (Ottawa University)
INTRODUCTION
Avian influenza (AI) is a virus that infects poultry 
and wild birds. AI consists of two general strains, 
highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) and low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI). HPAI, the dead-
lier of the two strains, is infectious and can spread 
between birds rapidly. Due to the severity of the 
virus, a rapid emergency response is required to 
quarantine and eradicate the infected flocks (U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service [USDA-APHIS], 2016a). 
An outbreak of AI can be catastrophic financially 
if infection occurs in 1 of the over 25,000 fam-
ily farms in the United States that produce broiler 
chickens. The economic consequences of an 
infected flock not only impact the producer whose 
birds initially contract the virus but also has the 
potential to infect other flocks, which potentially 
has implications at the state and global levels.
In 2016, the United States produced 9 million 
broilers weighing 54 billion pounds with a value 
of $26 billion (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
National Agricultural Statistics Service [USDA-
NASS], 2017). However, the total economic 
impact from the broiler industry was $313 billion 
in 2016 (Chicken Feeds America, 2016b). The 
top-producing states include Georgia, Arkansas, 
North Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi, which 
accounted for 59% of the total value of U.S. pro-
duction. For most of the top-producing states, 
broiler production is number one in cash receipts 
for all commodities in the state. Kentucky ranks 
seventh in the United States in broiler production, 
but like those states in the top five, cash receipts 
from broiler production are number one in the 
state at $1.02 billion for 2016 and are forecasted 
to increase to $1.13 billion in 2018 (USDA-NASS, 
2017). The boiler industry has a significant impact 
on local economies. For example, McLean County, 
Kentucky, has one of the highest concentrations 
of broiler houses in the state (350 houses) with 
a total economic impact on the county valued at 
$86.5 million in 2016 (Chicken Feeds America, 
2016a). Also, McLean County, Kentucky is one 
of the smallest counties in the state, which means 
that an HPAI outbreak in such a county would be 
devastating. Figure 1 illustrates that the majority 
of the county, due to its size, would be under quar-
antine from the required control zone of 10 km 
(USDA-APHIS, 2017c).
AI outbreaks in the U.S. poultry sector have 
been widespread since the first detection of the 
virus, in December 2014, in Washington state. 
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Following that, the virus spread across 21 states 
and impacted 211 commercial and 21 backyard 
poultry flocks by June 2015 (Johansson, Preston, 
& Seitzinger, 2016). This outbreak was considered 
the largest poultry health disaster in U.S. history. 
In total, 50 million chickens and turkeys died 
from HPAI during this time. The most substantial 
impact was in Minnesota and Iowa where 87% 
of the bird losses occurred, most of which were 
turkey and layer flocks (Ramos, MacLachlan, & 
Melton, 2017). The federal government expendi-
ture to control this outbreak was $879 million. A 
majority of the cost was for depopulation, clean-
ing, and disinfection (Johnasson et al., 2016; 
USDA-APHIS, 2016c). Since the 2014–2015 out-
break, 667,000 more birds have died from both 
HPAI and LPAI, costing the federal government 
$33 million for control measures. These outbreaks 
occurred in Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, Tennessee, 
and Kentucky, with the most recent occurring in 
March 2017 in a commercial broiler operation 
(USDA-APHIS, 2016d; USDA-APHIS, 2017b). 
While the federal government provides financial 
aid to a producer for depopulation, cleaning, and 
disinfecting, indemnity payments are only for the 
birds infected with HPAI. It is important to note 
that the contract grower is not guaranteed 100% 
of the indemnity payment, as a portion can be 
distributed to the owner/integrator. There is also 
no financial assistance provided for future loss of 
production while the contaminated area is cleared 
of the virus. This time frame could last more than 
120 days and has lasting financial implications 
(USDA-APHIS, 2017d). A 120-day loss of opera-
tion could mean that the producer loses income 
associated with two to three broiler flocks but still 
has the expenses of maintaining the facilities. The 
Crop Insurance Act impedes federal assistance 
from covering both the disease impacts and loss 
of business at the same time (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Risk Management Agency, 2015).
Private insurers are available but limited in 
capacity. One reason for the slow development of 
AI insurance is the possibility of moral hazard and 
adverse selection resulting in high premiums. Also, 
it is difficult to know the frequency and intensity 
of an AI outbreak. However, for livestock insur-
ance that covers AI to be successful, economically 
feasible premiums must exist (Boyd, Pai, & Porth, 
2013). The magnitude of potential loss and the 
financial impact at the producer level needs to 
be understood to establish economically feasible 
premiums. Additionally, without viable insurance 
options, producers need to fully understand the 
risks they are internalizing when producing poul-
try in an integrated system.
Given the value broilers in the United States, 
the clustering of broiler houses that often occur, 
the epidemic nature of AI, and the massive loss in 
production from AI infection in a broiler flock, 
investigating farm-level financial impacts from 
contracting AI is necessary. Prior literature is lack-
ing regarding the farm-level financial implications 
of contracting HPAI in a U.S. broiler operation. 
Figure 1. Quarantine Zone from a Hypothetical HPAI Outbreak in McLean County, Kentucky
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This research is required to advance the possibili-
ties of a government or privately supported HPAI 
insurance program. Therefore, the objectives of 
this research are to
1. Develop farm financial statements for a stan-
dard commercial U.S. broiler operation to 
estimate financial performance measures and 
the profitability of a broiler operation,
2. Determine the on-farm financial impact from 
an HPAI outbreak and the resulting loss of 
production,
3. Determine how the timing and length of the 
outbreak impacts farm financial performance 
measures and profitability,
4. Determine the on-farm equity required to 
self-insure against an HPAI outbreak, and
5. Demonstrate the problems of using stan-
dard financial measures for analyzing disease 
outbreaks under production contract arrange-
ments and present alternative measures for 
financial performance.
BACKGROUND
AI has received more attention than any other 
animal disease such as swine flu, foot-and-mouth 
disease, and Newcastle disease. This is because 
(1) it can be transmitted to humans and cause 
death; (2) local effects are severe and cause mas-
sive loss in production and income; (3) the dis-
ease is endemic in nature, and there are prolonged 
financial impacts of control measures; and (4) it 
can be transmitted through migratory birds, 
which means it has widespread global implica-
tions (McLeod, Morgan, Prakash, & Hinrichs, 
2005). Due to the potential magnitude of the dis-
ease, countries often ban imports of poultry from 
the infected area. During the 2014–2015 HPAI 
outbreak in the United States, 12 countries sus-
pended imports from the United States, and 39 
countries placed regional bans on specific coun-
ties in specific states (Davis, 2015). The regional-
ization approach, rather than a ban on the entire 
United States, reduced the trade impacts from the 
outbreak. Paarlberg, Seitzinger, and Lee (2007) 
indicated that without regionalization, poultry 
exports would fall 89% in the first quarter of an 
outbreak compared to only 19% when using a 
regional approach. Furthermore, research shows 
that regionalization lowers economic welfare 
losses to producers and reduces the overall eco-
nomic recovery time of an outbreak (Johnson, 
Hagerman, Thompson, & Kopral, 2015). How-
ever, it was more challenging to regionalize net 
exporting regions compared to net importing 
regions (Seitzinger & Paarlberg, 2016).
Trade restrictions due to an AI outbreak impact 
poultry prices globally. If an HPAI outbreak 
occurred in all four global regions (the United 
States, the European Union, Asia, and Latin Amer-
ica), global export prices would increase by 10% 
(Djunaidi and Djunaidi, 2007). During the 2014–
2015 HPAI outbreak in the United States, the price 
of eggs nearly doubled compared to the three-year 
average for large eggs (USDA-APHIS, 2016c). An 
AI outbreak would impact the price of not only 
poultry but also other agricultural commodities. 
Since the price of poultry would increase, it was 
estimated that fed steer price and barrow and 
gilt prices would increase by $4 cwt and $3 cwt, 
respectively. Also, corn and soybean prices would 
decrease during the first year of an outbreak by 
$0.12/bushel and $0.13/bushel, respectively 
(Brown, Madison, Goodwin, & Clark, 2007).
While the macroeconomic impacts of the U.S. 
poultry industry and the implications of an AI 
outbreak have been vastly researched, the farm-
level poultry economic research is lacking. Beach, 
Poulos, and Pattanayak (2007a, 2007b) devel-
oped a theoretical model that combined both an 
epidemiological model and an agricultural house-
hold model to maximize profits. While theoreti-
cal, the results suggest that policy instruments are 
required to compensate for destroyed poultry. Fur-
thermore, results suggested that if compensation 
was low, there would be a barrier to surveillance 
and rapid disease response. However, if too high, 
there would be disincentives to adopting biosecu-
rity measures on the farm. There was no data pre-
sented by Beach et al. (2007a, 2007b) that would 
determine the appropriate compensation level. 
This study occurred before the first outbreak in 
the United States for which USDA-APHIS com-
pensated for the fair market value of the flock 
lost due to HPAI. Other studies have examined 
the farm impact of an AI outbreak (Rahman & 
Sabur, 2003; Oyekole, 1984). These farm-level 
studies were on small-scale production scenarios 
in Nigeria and Bangladesh. While the production 
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and marketing of broilers differ substantially from 
the United States, the financial implications of 
an HPAI outbreak were significant. Rahman and 
Sabur (2003) indicated a reduction in gross reve-
nue at the farm level by 45% per 1,000 birds and 
a net margin reduction by 430% per 1,000 birds, 
which caused a temporary shutdown in farming 
operations. The financial implications of an AI 
outbreak in a commercial U.S. broiler operation 
would be significant, which requires a farm-level 
impact analysis.
METHODS
This essay develops a financial model of a typi-
cal vertically integrated broiler operation in the 
United States to assess the impact of HPAI. The 
model operation includes four poultry houses, 
each 43 feet wide and 600 feet long. Each house is 
assumed to place 32,300 birds per flock per house 
and sell birds at seven pounds each. Death loss 
is assumed to be 4% from placement to pickup 
by the integrator. The modeled broiler operation 
is also assumed to move five flocks per year with 
a 56-day grow-out period per flock and a 17-day 
empty (cleanout) period between flocks.
Additionally, this study examines the financial 
impacts for a beginning farmer and an experi-
enced farmer, as impacts are likely to differ based 
on the financial position of the operator. The defi-
nition for a beginning poultry farmer is based on 
requirements to qualify for the Beginning Farmer 
Loan Program through the Kentucky Agricultural 
Finance Corporation (KAFC). The KAFC lends 
money to farmers for agricultural investments by 
partnering with traditional lenders. Those qualify-
ing for the Beginning Farmer Loan Program can 
access a greater amount of capital through KAFC, 
which is willing to take on riskier loans with 
potentially below-market interest rates.
To be considered a beginning farmer, the indi-
vidual must have been farming less than 10 years, 
must have a net worth (or combined net worth with 
a spouse) of less than $500,000, and must have an 
off-farm income of less than $100,000. Individu-
als who receive poultry loans but do not qualify 
as beginning farmers are considered to be experi-
enced farmers. Initial financial positions for both 
beginning and experienced farmers are based on 
a review of recent loan applications to the KAFC. 
When considering financial positions, only current 
assets are considered to isolate the financial impli-
cations for the poultry operation alone. Current 
assets for beginning and experienced farmers are 
$4,133 and $64,466, respectively. These amounts 
effectively become the initial working capital for 
each operation.
The economic model is adapted from Okla-
homa state’s enterprise budgets using the 2016 
Poultry Summary from the Kentucky Farm Busi-
ness Management program. The initial contract 
price received per pound of production is $0.058. 
The contract price is the payment per pound of 
gain from the integrator to the operator. Initial 
operating costs are $22,380 annually per house, 
with 48% of this cost being utilities and 12% 
allocated to ongoing repair and maintenance. The 
latter is included to avoid a lump-sum payment 
to upgrade requirements at the termination of the 
initial contract.
Both prices received and operating costs are 
adjusted over time. After the first year the price 
per pound produced is increased by 1.125% annu-
ally, based on the USDA-NASS prices received per 
pound of chicken from 2000 to 2017. Costs are 
assumed to increase by 2.5% per year based on the 
USDA-NASS cost of farm supplies from 2000 to 
2017. Both trend adjustments are consistent with 
Goodwin, Ahrendesen, Barton, and Denton (2005).
Financing assumptions are also based on a 
review of KAFC loan packets over the previous 2 
years. Construction cost per house is assumed to 
be $346,263, for a total investment of $1,385,050. 
This approach is attractive as this is effectively a 
turn-key cost, meaning that the operation is fully 
operational for this amount. Houses are assumed 
to be financed over 15 years at a 5% interest 
rate. Fixed costs for the operation are based on 
a 15-year useful life and a 10% salvage value at 
the end of the 15 years. Interest on owned capi-
tal is charged at 5% to cover opportunity costs. 
Payment for birds, minus operating, financing, and 
fixed costs, are considered to be net farm income. 
It is assumed that the poultry operator will with-
draw 50% of net farm income annually for family 
living and reinvest the remaining 50% back into 
the operation to be held as working capital.
Based on the enterprise budgets and assump-
tions previously outlined, financial models consist-
ing of a 20-year income statement and cost-based 
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balance sheet are developed for both a beginning 
and an experienced farmer that are consistent with 
Kay, Edwards, and Duffy (2004). A completed 
income statement and balance sheet allows for the 
calculation of key performance measures, on an 
annual basis, for each operation using the stan-
dards set forth by the Farm Financial Standards 
Council (2019). Financial statements and perfor-
mance measures results are considered the base 
case from which to examine an HPIA outbreak.
Three outbreak timings are modeled to reflect 
the impact that HPAI had during the economic 
life of the broiler operation. HPAI effects are eval-
uated as if the infection occurred in years 2, 10, 
and 18. It is assumed that the infection would 
infect all four houses and that all houses would 
be immediately depopulated. A considerable delay 
in the placement of the next flock is also likely, 
so the impact is evaluated assuming the loss of 
the infected flock and the next flock as well as 
the infected flock plus the next two flocks. In the 
case of losing the infected flock and one new flock, 
operating expenses are reduced by 20% to reflect 
lower utility costs. In the case of losing the infected 
flock and the next two flocks, operating costs are 
reduced by 30%.
Finally, potential indemnity payments made by 
USDA-APHIS are considered. These payments are 
generally made to the integrator, since they own the 
birds, but were often shared with the grower. Each 
scenario previously described is evaluated with 
receipt of an indemnity payment equal to 100% 
of the payment value of the infected flock and 
without any indemnity payment for the infected 
flock. This results in three financial scenarios for 
which the farmer is not compensated for one, two, 
or three flocks.
Based on these assumptions, financial statements 
and financial measures are calculated for each of the 
HPAI infection scenarios. By comparing these to the 
base case (no HPAI infection), the financial impacts 
of HPAI on the growers are evaluated. Results 
include estimates of HPAI infection impacts for 
beginning and experienced farmers given multiple 
infection timings, number of lost flocks, and the 
potential impacts of APHIS indemnity payments.
While standard financial measures are com-
monly used to evaluate farm businesses, they can 
be problematic when used to evaluate contract 
production arrangements. For example, return on 
assets and asset turnover are two standard mea-
sures. Under a profitable contract production sys-
tem, these two measures will make a beginning 
farmer look financially better than an experienced 
farmer because the beginning farmer will have 
lower asset values than the beginning farmer. This 
can provide a misleading depiction of the finan-
cial health of the two operations. Similarly, if flock 
loss occurs and working capital is eroded, return 
on assets will be higher once operations resume 
because total assets have decreased due to work-
ing capital erosion. While this will be the case for 
both beginning and experienced farmers, it will be 
especially true for beginning farmers.
For this reason, two alternative measures are 
also utilized. The first measure, burn rate, is com-
monly used but is not considered among the 21 
financial measures recognized by the Farm Finan-
cial Standards Council (2019). Burn rate is calcu-
lated using the equation
(1) Burn Rate Operating Expenses
Working Capital
Burn rate is defined as the length of time a busi-
ness can continue to operate on existing working 
capital. If the burn rate is negative, this indicates 
how many periods of an outside financial source is 
required to continue operations.
In addition to the burn rate, a novel measure 
reflecting the long-term financial implications of 
contracting HPAI is developed. The long-term 
vulnerability ratio (LTVR) measures the number 
of periods the business could sustain operation 
through liquidation of equity from either selling 
off assets or borrowing against them. The LTVR is 
calculated using the equation
(2) LTVR Operating Expenses
Total Equity
If LTVR is negative, the business cannot cover 
variable costs from within and has no equity to 
borrow against and therefore would likely shut 
down or declare bankruptcy. However, off-farm 
income can supplement the business in the short 
term, but long-term business sustainability will be 
challenging with a prolonged negative LTVR. By 
using these two alternative measures in addition 
to traditional financial measures, a more thor-
ough understanding of the contracting operation 
is possible.
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RESULTS
Financial performance measures are determined 
for both an experienced and a beginning farmer 
operating four U.S. broiler houses over a 20-year 
time frame. Seven financial performance mea-
sures are calculated annually to determine liquid-
ity, solvency, profitability, and financial efficiency. 
More specifically, working capital, current ratio, 
debt-to-asset ratio, return on assets, operating 
profit margin, net farm income, and asset turnover 
are calculated annually for an experienced and 
a beginning farmer. The results for each farmer 
are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 and reflect a 
typical production environment in which no HPAI 
is present. Both farmer scenarios are under the 
same contractual arrangement, with the only dif-
ference being the initial current assets when apply-
ing for a loan to build the broiler houses ($4,133 
and $64,466 for the beginning and experienced 
farmer, respectively).
The experienced farmer’s broiler operation is in 
better overall financial position than the beginning 
farmer’s broiler operation. Working capital is nega-
tive for the first two years of the beginning farmer’s 
broiler operation, as can be seen in Table 2. Neg-
ative working capital indicates that the beginning 
farmer needs to acquire outside funding to support 
Table 1. Financial Performance Measures across 20 Years for an Experienced Farmer Operating Four 
U.S. Broiler Houses with No HPAI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Working 
capital ($)
24,667 51,727 77,192 100,956 122,907 142,929 160,900 176,691 190,168 201,190
Current 
ratio
1.345 1.690 1.984 2.228 2.428 2.585 2.703 2.785 2.833 2.851
Debt to 
asset
0.996 0.987 0.977 0.963 0.947 0.928 0.904 0.875 0.839 0.795
Return on 
assets




0.047 0.053 0.060 0.066 0.073 0.080 0.087 0.094 0.101 0.108
Net farm 
income ($)
25,694 29,445 33,331 37,359 41,536 45,870 50,369 55,041 59,896 64,943
Asset 
turnover
0.195 0.205 0.216 0.228 0.241 0.257 0.274 0.295 0.319 0.347
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Working 
capital ($)
209,608 215,269 218,008 217,655 347,471 480,500 613,544 746,579 879,583 1,012,531
Current 
ratio
2.840 2.802 2.741 2.658 84.403 116.333 148.268 180.200 212.124 244.036
Debt to 
asset
0.739 0.668 0.576 0.453 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004
Return on 
assets




0.116 0.124 0.132 0.140 0.148 0.156 0.155 0.153 0.152 0.150
Net farm 
income ($)
70,192 75,653 81,338 87,258 93,425 99,853 99,882 99,865 99,802 99,690
Asset 
turnover
0.381 0.424 0.477 0.548 0.644 0.512 0.426 0.366 0.322 0.288
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the broiler operation in the first two years or have 
off-farm income to support the operation. At a 
minimum, any farmer applying for a loan to build 
and operate four broiler houses needs $39,798 in 
current assets to have positive working capital in 
the first year. The current ratio indicated that an 
experienced farmer has good liquidity according to 
the Farm Finance Scorecard of greater than two in 
year 4 of the operation compared to year 4 for the 
beginning farmer (Becker, Kauppila, Rogers, Par-
sons, Nordquist, & Craven, 2014). Also, according 
to the Farm Finance Scorecard, the debt to asset 
ratio indicates that both farmers do not achieve 
strong solvency (<30%) until the four broiler 
houses are paid for in year 15.
Both farmers also have the same profitabil-
ity, according to net farm income, since both are 
assumed to have the same contractual arrangement 
and management strategies. Likewise, operating 
profit margin is the same for both farmers and 
achieve strong profitability after the four broiler 
houses are paid for in year 15. However, the return 
on assets indicates that the beginning farmer is 
more profitable than the experienced farmer. This 
result is one of the problems of using return on 
assets to evaluate the profitability of production 
Table 2. Financial Performance Measures across 20 Years for a Beginning Farmer Operating Four U.S. 
Broiler Houses with No HPAI
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Working 
capital ($)
–35,665 –8,605 16,860 40,623 62,574 82,597 100,567 116,359 129,836 140,858
Current 
ratio
0.502 0.885 1.215 1.494 1.727 1.916 2.064 2.175 2.252 2.296
Debt to 
asset
1.041 1.034 1.024 1.013 0.998 0.981 0.958 0.931 0.897 0.854
Return on 
assets




0.047 0.053 0.060 0.066 0.073 0.080 0.087 0.094 0.101 0.108
Net farm 
income ($)
25,694 29,445 33,331 37,359 41,536 45,870 50,369 55,041 59,896 64,943
Asset 
turnover
0.204 0.215 0.226 0.239 0.254 0.271 0.291 0.314 0.341 0.373
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Working 
capital ($)
149,276 154,936 157,675 157,323 287,138 420,167 553,211 686,247 819,251 952,199
Current 
ratio
2.310 2.297 2.259 2.199 69.921 101.852 133.786 165.718 197.643 229.554
Debt to 
asset
0.800 0.729 0.635 0.506 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004
Return on 
assets




0.116 0.124 0.132 0.140 0.148 0.156 0.155 0.153 0.152 0.150
Net farm 
income ($)
70,192 75,653 81,338 87,258 93,425 99,853 99,882 99,865 99,802 99,690
Asset 
turnover
0.412 0.462 0.526 0.612 0.735 0.567 0.463 0.393 0.342 0.304
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contract arrangements. Since the beginning farmer 
has lower current assets compared to the experi-
enced farmer, return on assets will be greater for the 
beginning farmer under contract production. This 
problem is also present when determining financial 
efficiency with asset turnover. More details will be 
discussed on this issue when addressing objective 
5 of this investigation.
After determining the financial measures under 
a typical production environment in which HPAI 
is not contracted, various scenarios are investi-
gated for which the broiler operation does con-
tract HPAI. Two critical questions are addressed 
regarding the outbreak: (1) how does the timing 
(across the 20-year financial model) of the out-
break impact farm financial performance mea-
sures, and (2) how does the length of the outbreak 
impact farm financial performance measures?
Three timings of the outbreak occurring in 
years 2, 10, and 18 are investigated. Also, for 
each timing, three lengths of time out of produc-
tion are investigated. One, two, and three flocks 
represent the number of flocks lost in the year 
HPAI occurred. For example, assume that HPAI 
infects a flock resulting in both the current flock 
(infected) and an additional flock lost due to the 
time required to contain and eradicate the virus. If 
USDA-APHIS provides an indemnity payment that 
is received by the farmer (not guaranteed), then 
the financial impact will be for only one flock lost. 
Given that the time frame required to contain and 
clear the area of the virus can be over 120 days, 
up to two additional flocks can be lost (not includ-
ing the flock contracted by HPAI). Furthermore, 
if the farmer does not receive the indemnity pay-
ment from USDA-APHIS and is out an additional 
two flocks for containment and eradication of the 
virus, the financial loss can total three flocks.
The financial impact of the timing of an HPAI 
outbreak and the number of flocks not compen-
sated for are presented in Tables 3–5. Summary 
statistics are presented for each farmer and finan-
cial measure for the HPAI outbreak scenarios 
investigated. From all three timings of the HPAI 
outbreaks, it is clear that the beginning farmer 
is more susceptible to significant financial losses 
compared to the experienced farmer due to the 
former’s more vulnerable financial position. Fur-
thermore, both farmers are financially impacted 
more when HPAI is contracted in year 2 than 
in year 18. Likewise, both farmers are impacted 
more when the containment and eradication of 
the virus last long enough (or the farmers do not 
receive the USDA-APHIS indemnity payment) so 
that three flocks are lost and a farmer is not com-
pensated. It is also important to note that the later 
in the grow-out period (56 days) when the flock is 
infected with HPAI, the higher the potential to be 
out new flocks due to the length of time to clear 
the virus. For example, if it takes 100 days to clear 
the virus and HPAI is contracted in day 2 of the 
56 days required to grow a broiler, only one new 
flock will be lost. If HPAI is contracted in day 55 
of the 56 days to grow a broiler, two new flocks 
will be lost.
The importance of implementing biosecurity 
measures to prevent HPAI early in a broiler oper-
ation is highlighted in Table 3. The loss of three 
flocks in year 2 results in a net farm income of 
–$128,903, the largest of all HPAI financial shocks 
investigated. This results in a reduction in average 
working capital of $136,444 for both farmers as 
compared to not contracting HPAI. More import-
ant is the working capital impact in the year HPAI 
is contracted. This is represented by the minimum 
working capital estimated for three flocks lost. The 
experienced farmer has a loss in working capital in 
year 2 of –$91,898 compared to –$152,230 for 
the beginning farmer.
The financial impact on annual working capi-
tal due to an HPAI outbreak is also presented in 
Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 illustrates that an expe-
rienced farmer will incur negative working capital 
for 5 years, at a cumulative value below zero of 
$222,415, after the broiler flock is infected with 
HPAI in year 2. Furthermore, Figure 3 illustrates 
that a beginning farmer will incur negative work-
ing capital for 10 years, at a cumulative loss of 
$646,623, after the broiler flock is infected with 
HPAI in year 2. For each farmer, after the initial 
infection of HPAI causing a decrease in working 
capital, working capital begins to accumulate at 
a steady pace once production resumes. Once 
the broiler houses are paid for in year 15, net 
returns and therefore working capital generated 
are greater, causing the steep increase illustrated 
in Figures 2 and 3. If biosecurity measures fail 
and the financial implications above are incurred, 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Financial Measures for Both an Experienced and a Beginning Farmer 
Based on the Number of Flocks Lost by Contracting HPAI in Year 2
















Average 309,504 262,728 214,139 173,060 249,171 202,395 153,807 112,727
Minimum 24,667 2,489 –48,656 –91,898 –35,665 –57,843 –108,988 –152,230
Maximum 1,012,531 963,293 912,148 868,906 952,199 902,961 851,815 808,574
C.V. 0.90 1.05 1.28 1.57 1.11 1.36 1.78 2.41
Current Ratio
Average 50.99 47.12 43.09 39.69 46.20 42.33 38.31 34.90
Minimum 1.34 1.03 0.35 –0.23 0.50 0.23 –0.45 –1.03
Maximum 244.04 232.22 219.94 209.56 229.55 217.74 205.46 195.08
C.V. 1.57 1.59 1.63 1.67 1.60 1.64 1.68 1.73
Debt to Asset
Average 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.68 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.73
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 1.00 1.02 1.07 1.11 1.04 1.07 1.12 1.16
C.V. 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.67 0.66
Return on Assets
Average 0.074 0.078 0.081 0.084 0.080 0.084 0.089 0.093
Minimum 0.045 0.040 0.000 –0.050 0.048 0.042 0.000 –0.053
Maximum 0.114 0.127 0.143 0.161 0.130 0.147 0.169 0.195
C.V. 0.223 0.229 0.360 0.483 0.248 0.298 0.389 0.510
Operating Profit Margin
Average 0.110 0.103 0.085 0.044 0.110 0.103 0.085 0.044
Minimum 0.047 –0.083 –0.445 –1.260 0.047 –0.083 –0.445 –1.260
Maximum 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156
C.V. 0.336 0.534 1.489 6.843 0.336 0.534 1.489 6.843
Net Farm Income ($)
Average 67,522 65,197 62,639 59,605 67,522 65,197 62,639 59,605
Minimum 25,694 –17,067 –68,213 –128,903 25,694 –17,067 –68,213 –128,903
Maximum 99,882 99,882 99,882 99,882 99,882 99,882 99,882 99,882
C.V. 0.38 0.47 0.62 0.83 0.38 0.47 0.62 0.83
Asset Turnover 
Average 0.348 0.368 0.394 0.419 0.377 0.402 0.434 0.466
Minimum 0.195 0.158 0.123 0.085 0.204 0.166 0.130 0.090
Maximum 0.644 0.716 0.810 0.911 0.735 0.830 0.959 1.103
C.V. 0.348 0.384 0.423 0.461 0.375 0.416 0.461 0.507
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Table 4. Summary Statistics of Financial Measures for Both an Experienced and a Beginning Farmer 
Based on the Number of Flocks Lost by Contracting HPAI in Year 10
















Average 309,504 290,414 259,651 234,183 249,171 230,082 199,318 173,851
Minimum 24,667 24,667 24,667 24,667 –35,665 –35,665 –35,665 –35,665
Maximum 1,012,531 977,823 921,889 875,585 952,199 917,491 861,557 815,253
C.V. 0.90 0.92 0.97 1.03 1.11 1.16 1.26 1.38
Current Ratio
Average 50.99 48.42 44.27 40.84 46.20 43.63 39.49 36.05
Minimum 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Maximum 244.04 235.70 222.28 211.16 229.55 221.22 207.80 196.68
C.V. 1.57 1.58 1.60 1.62 1.60 1.62 1.65 1.69
Debt to Asset
Average 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.65 0.67
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
C.V. 0.69 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.66 0.66
Return on Assets
Average 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.076 0.080 0.081 0.082 0.084
Minimum 0.045 0.041 –0.028 –0.093 0.048 0.045 –0.030 –0.102
Maximum 0.114 0.122 0.140 0.158 0.130 0.141 0.164 0.190
C.V. 0.223 0.270 0.440 0.631 0.248 0.299 0.469 0.661
Operating Profit Margin
Average 0.110 0.104 0.087 0.058 0.110 0.104 0.087 0.058
Minimum 0.047 –0.010 –0.347 –0.934 0.047 –0.010 –0.347 –0.934
Maximum 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156
C.V. 0.336 0.435 1.220 4.002 0.336 0.435 1.220 4.002
Net Farm Income ($)
Average 67,522. 64,163 61,366 59,051 67,522 64,163 61,366 59,051
Minimum 25,694 –2,236 –58,170 –104,474 25,694 –2,236 –58,170 –104,474
Maximum 99,881 99,881 99,881 99,881 99,881 99,881 99,881 99,881
C.V. 0.38 0.47 0.62 0.77 0.38 0.47 0.62 0.77
Asset Turnover 
Average 0.348 0.356 0.376 0.395 0.377 0.388 0.413 0.438
Minimum 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.154 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.168
Maximum 0.644 0.693 0.790 0.894 0.735 0.799 0.931 1.078
C.V. 0.348 0.383 0.441 0.500 0.375 0.415 0.481 0.548
11 Shockley, Mark, Burdine, and Russell / Journal of Applied Farm Economics 3, no. 1 (Spring 2020)
Table 5. Summary Statistics of Financial Measures for Both an Experienced and a Beginning Farmer 
Based on the Number of Flocks Lost by Contracting HPAI in Year 18
















Average 309,504 304,216 299,628 289,827 249,171 243,884 239,296 229,494
Minimum 24,667 24,667 24,667 24,667 –35,665 –35,665 –35,665 –35,665
Maximum 1,012,531 977,279 946,694 881,351 952,199 916,947 886,361 821,019
C.V. 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.82 1.11 1.09 1.08 1.04
Current Ratio
Average 50.99 49.72 48.62 46.27 46.20 44.93 43.83 41.48
Minimum 1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Maximum 244.04 235.57 228.23 212.55 229.55 221.09 213.75 198.07
C.V. 1.57 1.56 1.55 1.53 1.60 1.59 1.58 1.56
Debt to Asset
Average 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
Minimum 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maximum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
C.V. 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68
Return on Assets
Average 0.074 0.072 0.071 0.067 0.080 0.078 0.076 0.072
Minimum 0.045 0.020 –0.016 –0.104 0.048 0.022 –0.017 –0.113
Maximum 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130
C.V. 0.223 0.275 0.359 0.629 0.248 0.296 0.375 0.641
Operating Profit Margin
Average 0.110 0.105 0.098 0.069 0.110 0.105 0.098 0.069
Minimum 0.047 0.047 –0.087 –0.664 0.047 0.047 –0.087 –0.664
Maximum 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156 0.156
C.V. 0.336 0.351 0.565 2.497 0.336 0.351 0.565 2.497
Net Farm Income ($)
Average 67,522 63,997 60,938 58,467 67,522 63,997 60,938 58,467
Minimum 25,694 25,694 –31,810 –81,247 25,694 25,694 –31,810 –81,247
Maximum 99,882 99,882 99,882 99,882 99,882 99,882 99,882 99,882
C.V. 0.38 0.41 0.54 0.69 0.38 0.41 0.54 0.69
Asset Turnover 
Average 0.348 0.345 0.343 0.342 0.377 0.374 0.372 0.371
Minimum 0.195 0.195 0.195 0.161 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.175
Maximum 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.735 0.735 0.735 0.735
C.V. 0.348 0.352 0.360 0.372 0.375 0.380 0.388 0.398
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HPAI insurance or industry (integrator) support is 
required.
If HPAI is contracted later in the investment 
of the broiler operation, working capital is accu-
mulated and can minimize the financial impact 
of the outbreak. While contracting HPAI in year 
10 reduces net farm income to –$104,472, both 
farmers will be able to bear the loss through 
working capital. So, how much on-farm equity is 
required to self-insure against an HPAI outbreak? 
Table 6 addresses this question (objective 4) and 
presents the on-farm equity required to self-in-
sure against an HPAI outbreak based on timing 
and the number of flocks lost. Since the boiler 
operation is more profitable in year 18 versus 
year 2 due to trend adjustments over time, more 
cash or equity is required to self-insure. Nonethe-
less, working capital in year 18 is greater than in 
year 2 and is able to absorb the loss by self-in-
suring. However, it is more critical to have equity 
Figure 3. Impact on Annual Working Capital for a Beginning Farmer Based on the Number of 
Flocks Lost Due to Contracting HPAI in Year 2
Figure 2. Impact on Annual Working Capital for an Experienced Farmer Based on the Number of 
Flocks Lost Due to Contracting HPAI in Year 2
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in year 2, since the financial impact of an HPAI 
outbreak can permanently shut down the broiler 
operation.
In addition to financial measures, the impact on 
total equity from a broiler flock contracting HPAI 
in year 2 is measured and illustrated in Figures 4 
and 5. The difference between no HPAI in year 
2 and flocks lost is the same for the experienced 
and beginning farmers at $49,237, $100,383, and 
Figure 5. Impact on Total Equity for a Beginning Farmer Based on the Number of Flocks Lost 
Due to Contracting HPAI in Year 2
Figure 4. Impact on Total Equity for an Experienced Farmer Based on the Number of Flocks Lost 
Due to Contracting HPAI in Year 2
Table 6. On-Farm Equity Required to Self-Insure 
against an HPAI Outbreak Based on the Number 
of Flocks Lost and When the Outbreak Occurs
Number 
of Flocks Year 2 Year 10 Year 18
1 $46,512 $67,179 $70,504
2 $97,658 $123,113 $131,675
3 $158,348 $169,417 $181,112
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$143,625 loss in equity for one, two, and three 
flocks, respectively. However, the magnitude of 
loss and the time to regain positive equity are sig-
nificantly different between the farmers. For three 
flocks lost, the experienced farmer will incur total 
negative equity for 8 years with a cumulative loss 
of $543,309. In contrast, the beginning farmer 
will incur total negative equity for 10 years with a 
cumulative loss of $1,100,646. The fewer number 
of flocks lost, the earlier the producer could regain 
positive equity. Equity increases sharply at year 
15 for both farmers once loan payments for the 
broiler houses are complete. It is important to note 
that the beginning farmer does not attain positive 
equity in the broiler operation until year 5 under 
a typical production scenario without contracting 
HPAI. This highlights the importance and vulner-
ability of financing beginning farmers for broiler 
operations. Even with guaranteed production 
contracts, HPAI creates a real risk that will likely 
require insurance or industry (integrator) support 
during an outbreak.
As discussed previously, return on assets and 
asset turnover are problematic when evaluating 
contract production arrangements (Figure 6). 
Therefore, incorporating burn rate and LTVR pro-
vides a deeper understanding of these operations. 
Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the impact that one, 
two, and three flocks lost has on the burn rate of 
a four-house broiler operation. An HPAI outbreak 
in year 2 resulting in three flocks lost will reduce 
an experienced farmer’s burn rate to –1, indicat-
ing that the farmer must acquire funding from an 
outside source for one year of operating expense. 
Furthermore, it takes until year 6 for an experi-
enced farmer to exceed a burn rate of zero. The 
burn rate of the beginning farmer reduces to –2 as 
a result of the outbreak, indicating that the farmer 
must acquire funding from an outside source for 
two years of operating expense, and it takes until 
year 10 to exceed a burn rate of zero.
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the impact that one, 
two, and three flocks lost has on the LTVR of a 
four-house broiler operation. For the experienced 
farmer, an HPAI outbreak in year 2 will reduce the 
LTVR below zero but only for a short period if 
only one flock is lost. If three flocks are lost, it will 
take until year 9 for the LTVR to be above zero, 
which will require long-term off-farm income and 
potentially bankrupt the broiler operation.
The beginning farmer will require four years of 
off-farm employment under a typical production 
environment in which HPAI is not contracted. 
This is an indicator that the average beginning 
farmer applying for broiler loans should not have 
been awarded the loan or have proof of sustained 
off-farm income to supplement the first four 
years of the broiler operation. Furthermore, any 
Figure 6. Impact on Return on Investment for an Experienced Farmer Based on the Number of 
Flocks Lost Due to Contracting HPAI in Year 2
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HPAI outbreak in year 2 will bankrupt the oper-
ation for a beginning farmer, which further sup-
ports the need for enhanced biosecurity measures, 
HPAI insurance, and industry (integrator) support 
during an outbreak.
CONCLUSION
AI is a catastrophic disease that can cause a sig-
nificant financial loss in U.S. broiler operations. 
The magnitude of potential loss and the financial 
Figure 8. Impact on Burn Rate for a Beginning Farmer Based on the Number of Flocks Lost Due 
to Contracting HPAI in Year 2
Figure 7. Impact on Burn Rate for an Experienced Farmer Based on the Number of Flocks Lost 
Due to Contracting HPAI in Year 2
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impact at the producer level needs to be understood 
by the producer when undertaking an investment 
of this magnitude. Furthermore, it must be under-
stood to advance the possibilities of a government 
or privately supported HPAI insurance program to 
transfer this risk away from producers. This essay 
established baseline performance measures for a 
U.S. commercial broiler operation to determine 
the financial impact of an HPAI outbreak. The 
overall financial impact differed between the type 
of farmer (beginning or experienced), the timing 
of the outbreak, and the length of the outbreak. 
From all three timings investigated, it was evident 
that the beginning farmer was more susceptible to 
Figure 10. Impact on the Long-Term Vulnerability Index for a Beginning Farmer Based on the 
Number of Flocks Lost Due to Contracting HPAI in Year 2
Figure 9. Impact on the Long-Term Vulnerability Index for an Experienced Farmer Based on the 
Number of Flocks Lost Due to Contracting HPAI in Year 2
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significant financial losses compared to the experi-
enced farmer due to the former’s more vulnerable 
financial position. Furthermore, both farmers were 
financially impacted more when HPAI was con-
tracted early in the investment of the poultry farm 
rather than later, as significant equity had not yet 
been built to absorb the loss. Likewise, both farm-
ers were impacted more when contamination and 
eradication of the virus were prolonged as more 
flocks were lost.
The importance of implementing biosecurity to 
prevent HPAI early was highlighted by the reduc-
tion of net farm income by –$128,903 due to the 
loss of three flocks. This resulted in a reduction of 
working capital of –$136,444 for both beginning 
and experienced farmers. The financial impact 
on annual working capital was significant, as an 
experienced farmer would incur a negative work-
ing capital for 5 years after an early infection of 
HPAI and 10 years for a beginning farmer. If bios-
ecurity measures fail and the financial implications 
presented herein are incurred, HPAI insurance, 
industry support, or on-farm equity is required. 
The on-farm equity required to self-insure against 
an HPAI outbreak was also presented. Equity was 
needed early, as the financial implication of an out-
break could permanently shut down the broiler 
operation.
One of the most significant contributions of this 
essay was highlighting the fallacies of standard 
financial performance measures for evaluating 
contract production, especially when evaluating 
shocks such as an HPAI outbreak. Two alternative 
measures were presented for calculating profitabil-
ity impacts, burn rate, and LTVR. The LTVR is 
a novel measure reflecting the long-term financial 
implication of HPAI by calculating the number 
of periods the business could sustain operations 
through liquidation of equity from either selling 
off assets or borrowing against them. If LTVR 
was negative, the business could not cover vari-
able costs organically and had no equity to bor-
row against. Therefore, the operation would likely 
be forced to shut down or declare bankruptcy. 
Results from the LTVR measure indicated that 
an HPAI outbreak in year 2 would bankrupt the 
operation for a beginning farmer, which further 
supports the need for enhanced biosecurity mea-
sures, HPAI insurance, and industry (integrator) 
support during an outbreak.
Poultry loans are generally seen as low risk given 
the contractual arrangements between the farmer 
and the integrator. Furthermore, AI is a risk that is 
typically not considered, as it is perceived to have a 
low probability of occurring. However, the poten-
tial impact on the operation can be substantial and 
potentially catastrophic, as illustrated herein. This 
research quantifies the farm-level financial impact 
of an HPAI outbreak in a U.S. broiler operation. 
These results provide the foundation for future 
research about actuarially fair premiums to trans-
fer the financial risk of HPAI through insurance 
mechanisms.
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